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NOTE
The Paradox of "Actual Innocence" in Federal Habeas Corpus
After Herrera v. Collins
Were one to ask any American citizen whether our Constitution per-
mits the government to execute someone who can prove his innocence with
newly-discovered evidence, the response likely would be a quick and re-
sounding "No!" Intriguingly, when the Supreme Court was presented with
that question, its answer was not nearly so certain. Traditionally, the writ of
habeas corpus has guarded against such apparent miscarriages of justice.
Over the past decade, however, the Court has curtailed access to federal
habeas corpus relief to the extent that now, after the decision in Herrera v.
Collins,' it is not clear whether federal habeas corpus can save a state pris-
oner from execution-even when he can produce evidence of his
innocence.
The Herrera case presented the Court with the question of whether the
Constitution prohibits a state from executing a prisoner, without judicial
consideration of his claim of newly discovered exculpatory evidence, when
that claim is brought eight years after a procedurally fair trial.2 In an opin-
ion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court avoided answering that
question directly. To some members of the sharply divided Court,' the an-
swer was clear; other Justices did not reach the question at all. In the end,
the central point of agreement among a majority of the Court was that the
State of Texas was free to execute Leonel Herrera.4
After briefly summarizing the Herrera case,' this Note sketches the
development of federal habeas corpus relief, focusing on the Supreme
Court's decisions of the last decade limiting its availability.6 The Note then
examines the Herrera opinion in detail,7 concluding that the Court refused
to address the critical issue of the case.8 Instead, the Court perpetuated the
uncertainty confronting both lower federal courts and federal habeas peti-
tioners who bring claims based solely on new evidence of "actual inno-
1. 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993).
2. Id. at 874 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
3. Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined in the Chief Justice's opinion.
Justices O'Connor and Scalia wrote separate concurring opinions; Justice White concurred only in
the judgment; and Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, dissented.
4. Herrera was executed by lethal injection on May 12, 1993. Protesting Inmate Executed
in Texas, WASH. PosT, May 13, 1993, at A4.
5. See infra notes 11-37 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 38-78 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 79-133 and accompanying text.
8. See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
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cence."9 The ultimate question-whether a state can execute a prisoner
who has convincing evidence of his innocence without judicially consider-
ing that evidence-remains open.'0
Leonel Herrera was sentenced to death in January 1982 for the murder
of Texas police officer Enrique Carrisalez. 11 In July of that year, Herrera
pleaded guilty to the related murder of another Texas law enforcement offi-
cial, David Rucker.12  Herrera unsuccessfully challenged the Carrisalez
conviction and sentence on direct appeal and in collateral state court pro-
ceedings.' 3 He then filed a federal habeas petition, which was denied.14 In
1991, Herrera directed a second habeas petition to the state court, raising a
claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence.' 5 The
Court also denied this petition.' 6
9. See infra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 139-54 and accompanying text.
11. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 857. Carrisalez was shot in the chest after stopping Herrera for
speeding outside Los Fresnos, Texas. Before stopping, Carrisalez radioed a description of the car
and its license plates to the police station. The car belonged to Herrera's girlfriend, but Herrera
had the only keys to the vehicle. He had a set in his pocket at the time of his arrest. Id. at 872
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Carrisalez lived long enough to identify Herrera as his assailant, and
an eyewitness riding in Carrisalez's patrol car also identified Herrera as the killer. Id. at 871-72
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
12. Id. at 857. Rucker's body was found lying beside his patrol car; he had been shot in the
head. Herrera's Social Security card was found nearby. Id. Blood found on Herrera's clothing
matched Rucker's blood type, which was different from Herrera's. Id. Splatters of the same
blood type and strands of hair matching Rucker's were found in the vehicle involved in the shoot-
ing. Id. Perhaps the most damning piece of evidence was a handwritten and signed letter found
on Herrera's person at the time of his arrest. In it, Herrera implied that he killed Rucker and
offered to turn himself in. Indicating that he and Rucker were in the same "business," he wrote
that Rucker had "violated some of its laws and suffered the penalty, like the one you have for me
when the time comes." Id. at 857 n.l.
13. Id. at 858; see Herrera v. State, 682 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). The Supreme
Court denied certiorari. Herrera v. Texas, 471 U.S. 1131 (1985). Herrera's state habeas petition
was also denied. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 858.
14. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 858. The Supreme Court again denied certiorari. See Herrera v.
Collins, 498 U.S. 925 (1990).
15. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 858. In support of his petition, Herrera presented the affidavit of
Hector Villarreal, an attorney who had once represented his brother, Raul Herrera, Sr. Id. Villar-
real attested that Raul, Sr. told him that Leonel Herrera, Raul Herrera, Sr., Officer Rucker, and a
local sheriff were all involved in a drug-trafficking scheme and that Raul said that he was the one
who shot Officers Rucker and Carisalez. Id. at 858 n.2. According to Villarreal's affidavit, Raul,
Sr. told him this when he was representing him on a charge of attempted murder in 1984. Raul,
Sr. claimed that he never told anyone the truth because he expected his brother to be acquitted. Id.
After Leonel Herrera's conviction, Raul, Sr. began blackmailing the sheriff. According to Villar-
real, Raul, Sr. was killed by Jose Lopes, a comrade of the sheriff who assisted with
drug-trafficking activities. Id. Lopes allegedly was present at the murders of Rucker and Car-
risalez. Id Herrera also presented an affidavit by a former cellmate of Raul, Sr., who attested that
Raul, Sr. told him that he, not Leonel Herrera, shot Officers Rucker and Carrisalez. Id. at 858.
16. Id The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Ex parte Herrera, 819 S.W.2d 528
(Tex. Crim. App. 1991). The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. Herrera v. Texas, 112 S. Ct.
1074 (1992).
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Herrera filed a second federal habeas petition in 1992, some ten years
after his conviction. In this petition, he alleged that "he [was] innocent of
the murders of Carrisalez and Rucker, and that his execution would thus
violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments."' 7 He supported his peti-
tion with the affidavit of an eyewitness to the crime and other affidavits
tending to show that his deceased brother had committed the murders.' 8
The district court granted Herrera a stay of execution so that he could pres-
ent affidavits supporting his claim of actual innocence in state court. 19 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the stay of
execution,20 however, and the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari. 2 '
In Herrera v. Collins,'2 a sharply divided Court held that Herrera's
claim of actual innocence did not entitle him to federal habeas relief.23 The
majority found that "[c]laims of innocence based on newly discovered evi-
dence have never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent
an independent constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state
criminal proceeding."'24 The Court ruled that executive clemency was the
traditional remedy for claims of innocence like Herrera's. 5 Then, however,
the majority assumed arguendo-but declined to hold-that "a truly per-
suasive demonstration of 'actual innocence' made after trial would render
the execution of a defendant unconstitutional and warrant federal habeas
relief if there were no state avenue open to process such a claim."26 The
Court noted, however, that even if such a right existed, Herrera had failed to
17. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 858.
18. In addition to the affidavits of Raul, Sr.'s attorney and former cellmate, see supra note
15, Herrera presented an affidavit of Raul Herrera, Jr., the son of Raul, Sr. The affidavit claimed
that Raul, Jr. witnessed his father kill Officers Rucker and Carrisalez and that Leonel Herrera was
not present during the murders. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 858. At the time of the killings, Raul, Jr.
was nine years old. Herrera also presented the affidavit of a former schoolmate of the Herrera
brothers. The schoolmate claimed that Raul, Sr. told him in 1983 that he had shot the two of-
ficers. Id. Herrera alleged in his petition that law enforcement officials were aware of this evi-
dence and had unlawfully withheld it in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)
(holding that the prosecution's withholding of evidence favorable to the defendant constitutes a
violation of due process). Herrera, 113 S. CL at 858-59.
19. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 859. The district court granted an evidentiary hearing on Herrera's
claim of unlawfully withheld evidence. Id.
20. Id. The Fifth Circuit concluded that there was no evidentiary basis for Herrera's claim of
unlawfully withheld evidence. The court also held that Herrera's claim of actual innocence was
not a valid ground for relief under federal habeas corpus law in the absence of an independent
constitutional error in the underlying state proceedings. Herrera v. Collins, 954 F.2d 1029, 1032,
1034 (5th Cir. 1992), aft'd, 113 S. CL 853 (1993).
21. Herrera v. Collins, 112 S. Ct. 1074 (1992).
22. 113 S. CL 853 (1993).
23. 1& at 857.
24. Id at 860.
25. Id at 869.
26. Id.
1994]
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make a sufficiently persuasive demonstration of his actual innocence to
merit such relief.27 While opining that the threshold showing of actual in-
nocence would of necessity be "extraordinarily high,"28 the decision failed
to elaborate on exactly where such a threshold would lie.
Justice White concurred with the majority's assumption that a persua-
sive showing of actual innocence made after trial would make Herrera's
execution unconstitutional.2 9 He supported his finding that Herrera's evi-
dence was insufficient for habeas relief by testing it against the standard
generally used by the Court to reach the merits of a habeas petition that
challenges the constitutional sufficiency of the evidence-whether any ra-
tional trier of fact could find proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."
Two other members of the Court, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, filed a
separate opinion that concurred on the basis that federal habeas proceedings
and relief should be reserved for "extraordinarily high" and "truly persua-
sive demonstration[s] of 'actual innocence."' 31 The Justices agreed that
Herrera was not entitled to relief because he was clearly not innocent. 2
Nevertheless, their separate concurrence suggests that they were uncomfort-
able with the Court's reluctance to state that executing an innocent person
would be unconstitutional. Finally, Justices Scalia and Thomas joined in
the majority's opinion, but explicitly found no constitutional right "to de-
mand judicial consideration of newly discovered evidence of innocence
brought forward after conviction. 33
The three remaining members of the Court dissented. 4 Justice Black-
mun, writing for the dissenters, argued that Herrera could raise an Eighth
27. Id. at 869-70.
28. Id. at 869.
29. Id. at 875 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) ("I assume that a persuasive showing of
'actual innocence' made after trial, even though made after the expiration of the time provided by
law for the presentation of newly discovered evidence, would render unconstitutional the execu-
tion of petitioner in this case.").
30. 1d (White, J., concurring in the judgment). The standard suggested by Justice White
would require a federal habeas petitioner whose case was in the procedural posture of Herrera to
show, at a minimum, that "based on proffered newly discovered evidence and the entire record
before the jury that convicted him, 'no rational trier of fact could [find] proof of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt."' Id. (White, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307, 324 (1979)).
31. Id. at 874 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
32. Id. at 870 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The Justices agreed that "the execution of a legally
and factually innocent person would be a constitutionally intolerable event," but declared that the
"[p]etitioner is not innocent, in any sense of the word." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
33. Id at 874-75 (Scalia, J., concurring).
34. Id at 876 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinion was written by Justice
Blackmun, with Justices Stevens and Souter joining four of its five parts. Part V of the dissenting
opinion, which Justices Stevens and Souter declined to join, characterized the execution of a
person who can show his innocence as "com[ing] perilously close to simple murder." Id. at 884
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
482 (Vol. 72
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Amendment challenge as well as a substantive due process challenge to his
punishment on the ground that he was actually innocent. 5 The dissenting
Justices articulated a standard of proof under which a petitioner would be
required to show "probable innocence" in order to obtain relief.36 The dis-
senters would have remanded the case to the district court to consider
whether Herrera met the standard.37
This splintered decision reflects modem developments in a writ that is
rooted in ancient common law.38 The writ of habeas corpus, which was
incorporated into the United States Constitution as well as the constitutions
of all fifty states, is regarded as a fundamental safeguard of personal lib-
erty.39 The primary function of the writ is to release a prisoner who is
confined unlawfully. 4° It tests the legality of the prisoner's detention or
confinement, not his guilt or innocence.41 Although originally understood
to be a protection by which a prisoner could challenge a state conviction on
constitutional grounds related only to the jurisdiction of the state court, the
writ now extends to all constitutional challenges42 and is extolled as a "bul-
wark against convictions that violate 'fundamental fairness.' "4
Federal courts have had the power to issue the writ of habeas corpus
for persons in state custody for well over a century." Under federal law, a
35. l1& at 878-79 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
36. Under Justice Blackmun's approach, a petitioner claiming actual innocence would have
to show that he "probably is innocenf' to obtain habeas relief. In considering the actual innocence
claim, a court "should take all the evidence into account, giving due regard to its reliability." Id. at
883 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). This would entail a case-by-case determination of the reliability
of the newly discovered evidence under the circumstances. I& (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The
court then would weigh the evidence of innocence against the evidence of guilt. Id (Blackmun,
J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun would hold that the district court retains the discretion to order
discovery when necessary to help the court with its determination, but would not grant the peti-
tioner discovery as a matter of right. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 884 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
38. BLAcK's LAW DicnoNARY 491 (abridged 6th ed. 1991). The use of "habeas corpus" in
this Note refers to the common law writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, the writ to secure
release from unlawful confinement. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 474-75 n.6 (1976).
39. BLAcK's LAW DicIoNARY, supra note 38, at 491.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. But cf. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (holding that new constitutional rules of
criminal procedure generally will not be applied retroactively to cases that have become final
before the new rules were announced); Stone, 428 U.S. at 494-95 (limiting scope of federal habeas
review of Fourth Amendment violations).
43. Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2530 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
44. The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 2254 (1988)) was the first act empowering federal courts to issue a writ of habeas corpus
for persons in state custody. It imposed an automatic stay of execution pending disposition of an
appeal in capital cases. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 892 n.3 (1983) (citing Rogers v. Peck,
199 U.S. 425, 436 (1905)).
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federal court may entertain a state prisoner's claim that he is being held "in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States."'45 Unless the State elects to hold a new trial, the typical relief
granted to a successful federal habeas corpus petitioner is a conditional or-
der of release.' In a capital case in which the evidence presented on
habeas review relates only to the sentence, the usual remedy is a conditional
order vacating the death sentence.47
Federal statute and judicial doctrine limit a state prisoner's access to
the writ of habeas corpus.48 A petitioner who fails to follow state proce-
dures in presenting a constitutional claim to the state court may lose the
right to federal habeas review under the rules governing procedurally de-
faulted claims.49 At one time, only "deliberate bypassing" of state proce-
dural rules could forfeit the right to federal habeas review.5" In 1977,
however, the Supreme Court held in Wainwright v. Sykes"1 that procedural
default-whether deliberate or not-may be excused only when the peti-
tioner is able to show "cause and prejudice."52
A petitioner who brings a second or successive 53 petition may encoun-
ter another limitation on access to federal habeas corpus. Statutory rules
governing the exercise of federal habeas corpus provide that "[a] second or
successive petition may be dismissed if the judge finds that it fails to allege
new or different grounds for relief... [or if] the failure of the petitioner to
assert those grounds in a prior petition constituted an abuse of the writ."54
45. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1988). A federal habeas claim is cognizable only if all state reme-
dies have been exhausted or if there is no adequate state remedy available. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)
(1988).
46. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 862.
47. Id.
48. This Note addresses only the limitations on federal habeas corpus that are germane to the
analysis of the Court's decision in Herrera. For an extensive treatment of current federal habeas
corpus jurisprudence, see Kathleen Meagher & Geo. F. Hobday, Habeas Relieffor State Prison-
ers, 81 GEO. L.J. 1562 (1993). Encyclopedic coverage of federal habeas corpus procedural issues
is available in JAMEs S. LmnmAN, FEDERAL HABEAs CoRPus PiRAcncE AND PROCEDURE (1988 &
Supp. 1992).
49. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986).
50. This principle was established in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963), overruled by
Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2565 (1991).
51. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
52. Id. at 87. The standard for "cause," as developed in later cases of procedural default,
generally requires that some force outside the control of the petitioner have caused the default.
See, e.g., Murray, 477 U.S. at 488; accord McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1470 (1991).
"Prejudice" requires a showing of "'reasonable probability that, but for [the alleged] erro[r], the
result of the proceeding would have been different."' Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2532
(1992) (Stevens, ., concurring) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)).
53. "Successive claims" raise issues "identical to those raised and rejected on the merits on
prior petition." Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 445 n.6 (1986) (plurality opinion).
54. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 9(b) (1988). "Abuse of the writ" may arise when one makes a
new claim not previously raised. McCleskey, 111 S. Ct. at 1468.
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This provision protects the legitimate state interest in orderly criminal pro-
cedure by inhibiting needless, piecemeal presentation of constitutional
claims." It also assures that a state court, rather than a federal court, will
have the first opportunity to hear and consider a petitioner's claims. 6
If a petitioner is unable to establish cause and prejudice, a federal court
may nevertheless review his procedurally defaulted, abusive, or successive
claims if the failure to do so would "thwart the 'ends of justice"' 57 or work
a "fundamental miscarriage of justice."5 8 This latter exception rests on the
principle of "fundamental fairness," which is central to habeas corpus re-
view.5 9 Under the traditional view, "a 'fundamental miscarriage of justice'
occurs whenever a conviction or sentence is secured in violation of a federal
constitutional right."' Justice Holmes emphasized that the concern of a
federal habeas corpus court reviewing the validity of a conviction and death
sentence is "solely ...whether [the petitioner's] rights have been pre-
served."'" Thus, habeas corpus relief traditionally extended equally to the
innocent petitioner and to the admittedly guilty petitioner who was attempt-
ing to vindicate his constitutional rights.62
Over the last decade, however, the Supreme Court has shifted the fo-
cus of habeas review from the pure preservation of constitutional rights to a
fact-based inquiry into the petitioner's innocence or guilt.63 A trio of cases
decided in 1986 broke from the traditional view and signalled a trend to-
ward sharply restricting access to federal habeas relief. The first of these
decisions, Kuhlmann v. Wilson,' narrowed the reviewability of successive
petitions by holding that, in the absence of a showing of cause and preju-
dice, "the ends of justice" require consideration of a successive claim only
if the petitioner "establish[es] that under the probative evidence he has a
The Supreme Court restricted the federal judge's discretion under this rule by subjecting
abusive claims to the "cause and prejudice" requirement of Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72
(1977), see supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. See McCleskey, 111 S. Ct. at 1470.
55. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963).
56. McCleskey, 111 S. Ct. at 1470.
57. Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2525 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment)
(quoting Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 455 (plurality opinion)).
58. Id. at 2525 (Blackmun, ., concurring) (citing McCleskey, 111 S. Ct. at 1470; Dugger v.
Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 412 n.6 (1989); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537-38 (1986); Murray v.
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986)).
59. ld. at 2530 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
60. Id. at 2525 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1988));
Smith, 477 U.S. at 543-44 (Stevens, ., dissenting)).
61. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 87-88 (1923).
62. See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 467 (1986) (Brennan, ., dissenting); Kim-
melman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 380 (1986).
63. Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2526 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment) (citing Kuhlmann,
477 U.S. at 454) (plurality opinion).
64. 477 U.S. 436 (1986) (plurality opinion).
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colorable claim of factual innocence."'65 In Murray v. Carrier,66 the Court
announced that under the "miscarriage of justice exception" to the rule re-
quiring a petitioner to show "cause and prejudice," a federal habeas court
could reach the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim "in an extraordi-
nary case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the con-
viction of one who is actually innocent."'67 The third case in the 1986
trilogy, Smith v. Murray,68 emphasized that the miscarriage of justice ex-
ception addressed actual, as compared to legal, innocence.69 Subsequent
Supreme Court opinions have continued to equate "miscarriage of justice"
with "actual innocence,"7 but have done so without clearly defining that
concept.71
65. Id, at 454 (Powell, J., concurring). The Court relied on the standard for reversals in
habeas corpus developed by Judge Henry Friendly in his classic work, Henry J. Friendly, Is Inno-
cence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 142, 160 (1970).
Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 454.
66. 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
67. lId at 496; accord Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2565 (1991) (holding that
federal habeas review of procedurally defaulted claims is precluded unless petitioner can demon-
strate cause and prejudice or show that failure to consider the claims will result in a "fundamental
miscarriage of justice").
68. 477 U.S. 527 (1986).
69. Id. at 538-39 (stating that a procedural default will not be excused in the absence of cause
and prejudice "in cases devoid of any substantial claim that the alleged error undermined the
accuracy of the guilt or sentencing determination"). The Court applied the concept of actual
innocence to an alleged error at the sentencing phase of a trial on a capital offense and found that
no miscarriage of justice would result from the alleged error because it "neither precluded the
development of true facts nor resulted in the admission of false ones." Id. at 538.
70. See, e.g., Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 412 n.6 (1989) (stating that an error which
might have affected the accuracy of a death sentence does not demonstrate actual innocence of the
sentence); McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1474 (1991) (holding an alleged constitutional
violation inconsequential because, even if true, it did not affect the reliability of the determination
of petitioner's guilt.)
71. In Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514 (1992), the Court considered the meaning of actual
innocence in the context of capital punishment:
A prototypical example of "actual innocence" in a colloquial sense is the case where the
State has convicted the wrong person of the crime.... In rare instances it may turn out
later, for example, that another person has credibly confessed to the crime, and it is
evident that the law has made a mistake.
Id. at 2519-20. The Sawyer Court applied the concept of actual innocence to innocence of the
death penalty. See infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
Commentators have explored the meaning of "actual" as compared to "legal" innocence.
See, e.g., Stephen P. Garvey, Death-Innocence and the Law of Habeas Corpus, 56 ALa. L. REv.
225 passim (1992); Bruce Ledewitz, Habeas Corpus as a Safety Valve for Innocence, 18 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & Soc. CHANrE 415 passim (1991). One commentator suggests that the distinction be-
tween the types of innocence derives from their different evidentiary bases. Garvey, supra, at
248. A claim of "legal" innocence is one that "but for some error infecting the trial, the jury
would have found the defendant not guilty based on all the legally admissible evidence." Id.(emphasis added). In contrast, a claim of "actual" innocence is one that "but for the error, the jury
would have found the defendant not guilty based on all relevant and probative evidence, legally
admissible or not." Id. (emphasis added).
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In addition to changing the focus of its inquiry in federal habeas cases,
the Court has hinted that, in the future, it may demand that a petitioner
present more evidence to avoid summary dismissal of a successive, abusive,
or defaulted habeas claim.72 Under the federal statute, a habeas petition
may be summarily dismissed only "[ilf it plainly appears from the face of
the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled
to relief."73 When reviewing successive, defaulted, and abusive claims
under the miscarriage of justice exception, the Court generally has required
a more substantial showing before reaching the merits of the claim.7 4 The
standard typically applied requires a petitioner to show that the alleged con-
stitutional error probably resulted in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.75
The Court demanded more than this customary standard, however, in Saw-
yer v. Whitley,76 a 1992 habeas case challenging the propriety of a peti-
tioner's death sentence.7 7 It declared that actual innocence of a death
sentence requires a showing of "clear and convincing evidence that but for a
constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found the petitioner
eligible for the death penalty under the applicable state law."
78
The Herrera opinion confirms that actual innocence remains the domi-
nant consideration in the Court's analysis of successive, abusive, and de-
faulted federal habeas claims when the petitioner is unable to show cause
This description of actual innocence accords with Judge Friendly's formulation of a "colora-
ble showing of innocence":
A defendant would not bring himself within this criterion by showing that he might not,
or even would not, have been convicted in the absence of evidence claimed to have been
unconstitutionally obtained.... mhe petitioner.., must show a fair probability that,
in light of all the evidence, including that alleged to have been illegally admitted (but
with due regard to any unreliability of it) and evidence tenably claimed to have been
wrongly excluded or to have become available only after the trial, the trier of the facts
would have entertained a reasonable doubt of his guilt.
Friendly, supra note 65, at 160.
72. See Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2523.
73. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 4 (1988).
74. See, e.g., Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2522 ("If federal habeas review of capital sentences is to
be at all rational, petitioner must show something more in order for a court to reach the merits of
his claims on a successive habeas petition than he would have had to show to obtain relief on his
first habeas petition.").
75. Il at 2532 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
76. 112 S. Ct. 2514 (1992).
77. Id. at 2517.
78. ML "Innocence of the death penalty" can be shown by proof that there were no aggravat-
ing circumstances present or that other requirements necessary for death penalty eligibility were
not met. Id. at 2522.
The Herrera Court did not specify whether the "clear and convincing evidence" standard of
Sawyer was applied to Herrera's claim that he was actually innocent of the offense. It would have
made little sense to apply it in his case, since it requires a showing of constitutional error in the
state trial or proceedings. Herrera's claim was that such error need not be demonstrated, because
his actual innocence made his execution itself unconstitutional. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 856-57.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
and prejudice.79 For the first time, a death-sentenced petitioner presented
the Court with a free-standing habeas corpus claim of actual innocence-
one unsupported by an underlying constitutional error in the proceedings
below. 0 Ironically, the Court's response in Herrera suggests that even
convincing proof of actual innocence may not suffice to save such a peti-
tioner from execution."' The opinion teaches little about the standard to be
applied to these claims, focusing instead on the justifications for proscribing
federal habeas review in the absence of an underlying constitutional error.82
The principal issue in Herrera was whether Leonel Herrera's claim of
actual innocence, based on newly discovered evidence, constituted grounds
for federal habeas relief.13 This question was properly analyzed under the
"miscarriage of justice" exception governing federal habeas review of de-
faulted, abusive, and successive claims.8 4 Because the underlying claim in
a habeas proceeding is an allegation of constitutional error, the Court has
considered such an error in the state court proceedings below a prerequisite
to any habeas claim. 5 A claim of actual innocence is an additional require-
ment for relief imposed by the Court when a petitioner would otherwise be
subject to state defenses of abusive or successive use of the writ.86 Leonel
Herrera did not claim that there was constitutional error in the Texas pro-
ceedings themselves.8 7 Instead, the crux of his argument for habeas relief
was that his actual innocence of the murders for which he was convicted
both created constitutional error-by making his execution unconstitu-
tional-and satisfied the actual innocence requirement imposed by the
Court.s8
The Supreme Court failed to address directly whether, in a capital
case, a claim of newly discovered evidence of actual innocence raises a
constitutional challenge sufficient to provide federal habeas corpus review.
Instead, the majority espoused the traditional view that federal habeas re-
79. See Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 862, 873 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 862.
81. See infra notes 92, 100, 105 and accompanying text.
82. See infra notes 89-104 and accompanying text.
83. See supra text accompanying note 2.
84. This was Herrera's second federal habeas petition. See supra text accompanying note 17;
see also supra notes 49-71 and accompanying text (discussing defaulted, successive, and abusive
claims). He did not show "cause and prejudice." Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 872 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (stating that affidavits produced in support of petitioner's claim were "suspect" be-
cause they were produced at "the eleventh hour with no reasonable explanation for the nearly
decade-long delay").
85. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 869 ("Federal habeas review of state convictions has traditionally
been limited to claims of constitutional violations occurring in the course of the underlying state
criminal proceedings.").
86. Id. at 862.
87. Id.
88. See supra text accompanying note 17.
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view is not proper without an underlying constitutional claim. 9 The Court
presented a number of justifications supporting its conclusion that Herrera
failed to establish an Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment violation and thus
had no underlying constitutional claim to support habeas review. First, the
Court noted that federal habeas courts do not sit to relitigate state trials.90
Second, although Herrera failed to describe precisely the type of federal
relief he sought, the Court found that the usual remedy in capital cases-a
conditional order of release-would require the state to retry Herrera ten
years after his first trial. This new trial consequently would not guarantee a
more reliable jury verdict.9 ' Third, the Court concluded that previous
cases have established that actual innocence is not itself a constitutional
claim, but rather a "gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to
have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits."9"
Although this last argument comes close to addressing the issue the peti-
tioner raised, it fails to confront directly the question of whether Herrera's
claim-that his execution would be unconstitutional because he is actually
innocent-is itself a constitutional claim sufficient to entitle him to habeas
relief. The Chief Justice and a majority of the Court seemed to view Her-
rera's petition as contesting his guilt rather than his punishment.93
The Court then disposed of Herrera's Fourteenth Amendment claim by
finding that Texas's refusal to consider the new evidence eight years after
Herrera's conviction did not transgress "a principle of fundamental fair-
ness" 94 in view of the practices of a majority of the states.95 Moreover, the
89. See infra text accompanying note 92. The Chief Justice did not consider a claim of
actual innocence, standing alone, to be a constitutional claim. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 862.
90. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 861 (citing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983)). Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist distinguished Herrera's case from Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), in
which the Court held that federal habeas relief is appropriate for a claim brought on the ground
that "the evidence cannot fairly be deemed sufficient to have established guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt." Id. at 322. The Jackson case limited federal habeas review to the record evidence pro-
duced at trial. Id. at 324.
91. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 862.
92. Id at 862.
93. The Chief Justice characterized Herrera's claim in this way: "[P]etitioner's claim is not
that some error was made in imposing a capital sentence upon him, but that a fundamental error
was made in finding him guilty of the underlying murder in the first place." Id. at 863. Justice
O'Connor's description of his claim was: "Petitioner ... does not appear before us as an innocent
man on the verge of execution. He is instead a legally guilty one who, refusing to accept the
jury's verdict, demands a hearing in which to have his culpability determined once again." Id. at
870 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
94. Id. at 866 (citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977) (holding that the Due
Process Clause is not violated unless state action offends a "principle of justice so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental")).
95. At the time Herrera was decided, only fifteen states allowed a new trial motion based on
newly discovered evidence to be filed more than three years after conviction. Of those, only nine
states had no time limits whatsoever. l. at 866.
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Court explained that the traditional remedy for claims of innocence based
on new evidence is executive clemency.9" The Court noted that clemency
provides the "'fail safe' in our criminal justice system" for claims of inno-
cence based on new evidence that are advanced too late to file a new trial
motion.97 The majority observed that Herrera could request a pardon from
the governor on the grounds of innocence.98
Having found that Herrera had no claim based on a violation of the
Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment, and thus no constitutional right to de-
mand that his claim of actual innocence be considered, the majority then
assumed, arguendo, an affirmative answer to the very question it had re-
fused to confront earlier-whether evidence of actual innocence presented
after trial could render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional and
warrant federal habeas relief.99 The Court noted that, even if a "truly per-
suasive demonstration of 'actual innocence"' would create a right to federal
habeas review, Herrera's claim fell short of the "extraordinarily high"
threshold that would necessarily be required." ° The decision failed to dis-
cuss precisely where that threshold would lie; furthermore, it is unclear
whether the opinion was referring to the threshold necessary to allow a
court to reach the merits or to the threshold demonstration necessary to
obtain relief.1"1 The Court faulted the defects in Herrera's evidence, noting
that Herrera presented only affidavits in support of his innocence."m The
affidavits consisted primarily of hearsay and contained inconsistencies. 10 3
Further, Herrera failed to explain adequately why he had not produced the
affidavits earlier and why he had pleaded guilty to Rucker's murder."
96. Id. at 866-69.
97. Id at 869 (citing KATHLmE DEAN MooRE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MEcRY, AND THE PUBLIC
IRsr 131 (1989)). Texas law requires that a new trial motion based on newly discovered
evidence be made within sixty days of judgment. Id. at 865.
98. Id. at 868-69. At the time of the decision, Herrera had not applied for a pardon or com-
mutation. Id
99. Id at 869.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 870 ("Mhis showing of innocence falls far short of that which would have to be
made to trigger the sort of constitutional claim which we have assumed arguendo to exist.").
102. Id at 869. Justice Blackmun chastised the Court for criticizing Herrera's evidence, not-
ing that affidavits are commonly relied upon at the preliminary stage of a habeas proceeding. He
stated:
It makes no sense for this Court to impugn the reliability of petitioner's evidence on the
ground that its credibility has not been tested when the reason its credibility has not been
tested is that petitioner's habeas proceeding has been truncated by the Court of Appeals
and now by this Court. In its haste to deny petitioner relief, the majority seems to
confuse the question whether the petition may be dismissed summarily with the question
whether petitioner is entitled to relief on the merits of his claim.
Id. at 884 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 869; see supra notes 15, 18.
104. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 869-70; see supra text accompanying note 12.
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The Court's position creates a paradox for a federal habeas corpus pe-
titioner who faces a death sentence and tries to bring a successive, de-
faulted, or abusive claim solely on grounds of actual innocence. Under the
Court's arguendo analysis, a truly persuasive showing of innocence would
render the petitioner's execution unconstitutional and give rise to habeas
relief; but, since a constitutional claim is a prerequisite to habeas review,
the petitioner is not entitled to a habeas forum in which to make his "truly
persuasive" showing of innocence.105
In a concurring opinion, in which Justice Kennedy joined, Justice
O'Connor acknowledged that executing a legally and factually innocent
person is unconstitutional.10 6 She also expressed reservations about holding
that a legally guilty prisoner sentenced to death would never be entitled to
another judicial proceeding in the absence of an underlying constitutional
error.107 Nonetheless, she easily determined that Herrera's case was not the
proper one for deciding this issue.'08 Finding that the overwhelming evi-
dence of Herrera's guilt precluded any further proceedings in his case, 1' 9
Justice O'Connor argued that the Court should reserve federal proceedings
and relief for "'truly persuasive demonstration[s]"' of innocence." 0
Joined by Justice Thomas in his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia
would have preferred to address the central issue of the case, finding the
answer "perfectly clear": Newly discovered evidence relevant only to a
state prisoner's guilt or innocence is not a basis for federal habeas corpus
relief under any circumstances. Therefore, Herrera had no constitutional
right to demand judicial consideration of his newly discovered evidence."'
To Justice White, who concurred in the judgment but did not join the
majority's opinion, the answer was equally clear, though antithetical to Jus-
tice Scalia's solution."' Justice White would allow federal habeas relief
105. The irony of this position was not lost on Justice Blackmun, who observed:
[HIaving held that a prisoner who is incarcerated in violation of the Constitution must
show he is actually innocent to obtain relief, the majority would now hold that a pris-
oner who is actually innocent must show a constitutional violation to obtain relief. The
only principle that would appear to reconcile these two positions is the principle that
habeas relief should be denied whenever possible.
Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 880-81 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 870 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
107. Justice O'Connor commented: "The question is a sensitive and. .. troubling one. It
implicates not just the life of a single individual, but also the State's powerful and legitimate
interest in punishing the guilty, and the nature of state-federal relations." Id. at 871 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
108. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
109. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring); see supra notes 11-12.
110. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 874 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting the majority's opinion, id.
at 869). Justice O'Connor did not articulate more specific requirements for such a demonstration.
111. Id. at 874-75 (Scalia, J., concurring).
112. See supra text accompanying note 111.
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for a prisoner in Herrera's position if new evidence, on balance with the
evidence originally put before the jury, was so strong that "'no rational trier
of fact could [find] proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."' 113 Justice
White found Herrera's evidence insufficient to meet this standard.' 14
The three remaining members of the Court, Justices Blackmun, Ste-
vens, and Souter, found authority for Herrera's claim in both the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Using the "evolving standards of decency" 1 5 test
for Eighth Amendment challenges, Justice Blackmun argued that "the exe-
cution of an innocent person is 'at odds with contemporary standards of
fairness and decency.' Indeed, it is at odds with any standard of decency
that I can imagine." '16 According to Justice Blackmun, Herrera could have
raised a substantive due process challenge to his punishment on the grounds
that he was actually innocent; the execution of an innocent person, he ar-
gued, is the "ultimate 'arbitrary impositio[n]"' since there is no recovery
from it or adequate compensation for it.1 7 Justice Blackmun would adopt
the "fair probability" test as the threshold for a court to reach the merits of a
petitioner's claim.' 18 For relief on the merits, the dissenters would require a
petitioner to show that he is "probably innocent.""' 9
113. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 875 (White, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting Jackson v. Vir-
ginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (establishing standard to merit relief in habeas proceeding)); see also
supra note 30 and accompanying text (describing "no rational trier of fact" standard).
114. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 875 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
115. This standard was described by the Court as taking into account "objective evidence of
contemporary values" in evaluating whether a particular punishment is compatible with Eighth
Amendment protections of "fundamental human dignity." See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.
399, 406 (1986) (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
116. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 876 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
117. Id. at 879 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (citing Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2805 (1992) (noting that the Due Process Clause includes freedom from
all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints)).
118. Id. at 882 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The "fair probability" standard requires a petitioner
to show a "'fair probability that, in light of all the evidence ... the trier of facts would have
entertained a reasonable doubt of his guilt."' Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Kuhlmann
v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 455 n.17 (1986) (plurality opinion)). This is the standard that the Court
has applied to "actual innocence" habeas claims. See, e.g., Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496
(1986) (holding that the actual-innocence exception applies when a constitutional violation proba-
bly resulted in a mistaken conviction); McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1470 (1991) (holding
that the exception applies when a constitutional violation probably has caused a mistaken convic-
tion); see also supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text (applying the "reasonable doubt"
standard).
119. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. In support of this higher threshold, Justice
Blackmun argued two points: First, a state is unlikely to retry a habeas petitioner who is success-
ful in an actual-innocence proceeding, so the conviction or sentence should not be set aside
lightly. Second, because the petitioner has been duly convicted, he loses the presumption of inno-
cence, making it fair to place on him the burden of proving his innocence. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at
882-83 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Thus, while six Justices12 agreed that Herrera was a relatively easy
case to decide on its facts, their opinions suggest that several of these Jus-
tices might approach a more difficult case very differently. 12 ' A separate
group of six Justices' 22 intimated or stated that they would recognize, in an
appropriate capital case, a constitutional right to habeas relief based on
newly discovered evidence of actual innocence." Still, these Justices dif-
fered in what they would demand of the habeas petitioner's evidence of
actual innocence; requirements ranged from the relatively lax standard
urged by Justice White'l to the vague "truly persuasive demonstration"
proposed by Justice O'Connor"z and the "fair probability" and "probable
innocence" tests advocated by Justice Blackmun.' 26
The Court's split in the Herrera case reveals both the ideological dif-
ferences dividing the Court and the difficulty of resolving issues that pit
states' interests in the finality of criminal judgments against justice in indi-
vidual cases.' 2 7 Herrera gave the Court an opportunity to establish that,
when necessary, individual justice will prevail over rigid rules controlling
120. These include Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy,
and Thomas.
121. The opinions of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and White implied that they would not
absolutely preclude consideration of new evidence of actual innocence in all cases. See supra
notes 107, 113 and accompanying text.
122. This group included Justices White, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter.
123. See supra notes 107, 113, 116-19 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 30.
125. See supra text accompanying note 110.
126. See supra notes 36, 117-18 and accompanying text.
127. Compelling state and social interests are at stake in federal habeas review. In
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), Justice Powell identified the "costs" associated
with federal habeas corpus: (1) the cost to finality in criminal litigation, id. at 262 (Powell, J.,
concurring) ("No effective judicial system can afford to concede the continuing theoretical possi-
bility that there is error in every trial and that every incarceration is unfounded. At some point the
law must convey ... that one should no longer look back with the view to resurrecting every
imaginable basis for further litigation but rather should look forward to rehabilitation and to be-
coming a constructive citizen."); (2) the ineffective use of judicial resources that results from
duplicated effort and that threatens the federal system's capacity to resolve primary disputes, id. at
260-61 (Powell, J., concurring); and (3) the subversion of the constitutional balance between state
and federal governments that occurs when state criminal convictions are subjected indefinitely to
repeated federal oversight, id. at 263 (Powell, J., concurring).
The Supreme Court has raised several other concerns related to the effect of habeas corpus on
finality in criminal justice. First, easy access to habeas corpus may "degrade the prominence of
the trial itself." Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127 (1982). Second, habeas corpus often causes
society to lose the right to punish admitted offenders because conviction on retrial may be difficult
or impossible due to the passage of time. Id. at 127-28. Last, the absence of finality may frustrate
deterrence and rehabilitation. I. at 127 n.32.
These concerns of finality, conservation of judicial resources, and comity are magnified in
the case of second and subsequent habeas petitions. McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1469
(1991) ("Perpetual disrespect for the finality of convictions disparages the entire criminal justice
system").
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access to federal habeas corpus relief. Thus, one troubling aspect of the
Herrera decision is the Court's apparent reluctance to accept that when an
individual's life is at stake, compliance with rules must yield to justice for
the individual.128 Even more disturbing, Justices Scalia and Thomas clearly
believe that the Constitution provides no protection whatsoever to a con-
demned innocent person for whom the justice system has failed-even
when the result is the taking of an innocent life.129
While the Herrera case was disposed of readily on its facts, the next
case may be closer to the "archetypal"' 130 case of manifest miscarriage of
justice-a credible confession, obtained years after the crime, that exoner-
ates a prisoner under sentence of death. Under the Court's analysis, it
seems possible that, even with an undisputed confession from the actual
perpetrator in hand, a truly innocent prisoner might not be granted a federal
habeas hearing in which to present his evidence of actual innocence if he
were unable also to show some underlying error-in his trial or other state
court proceedings-that independently made his conviction unconstitu-
tional. If the Court demands that its high standard of proof be met before it
will allow the prisoner to develop his evidence at an evidentiary hearing,
then the prisoner would be restricted to the proof presented with his habeas
petition. That limited evidence may well fail to meet the majority's stan-
dard, and consequently, the factually innocent prisoner would be denied
habeas review and could be executed.
Such a result hardly would comport with the notion of our Constitution
as a guardian of individual freedom. Furthermore, it is difficult to think of
anything that would more readily undermine confidence in our judicial sys-
tem than for the Court to be perceived as allowing an innocent person to be
executed in the name of strict allegiance to abstract legal principles. It
would not be surprising if the average citizen found it both perplexing and
alarming that such apparently patent unfairness could go uncorrected.
Further, the Court's reliance on executive clemency as the appropriate
safeguard to catch and correct such injustices is unconvincing.' 3 ' There is
little or no reason to believe that a state governor is in a better position to
128. This statement is not intended to suggest that stringent criminal procedural rules should
be ignored in order to punish the "actually guilty" defendant who would otherwise escape penalty,
even when this might effect 'Justice" for the defendant's victim or for society. The purpose of
adhering to criminal procedural rules on the one hand, and subordinating the federal habeas rules
when necessary, on the other, is to reach a common goal-to avoid punishing the innocent.
129. Apparently, to these Justices, death is not so "different" after all. Compare this view with
Justice Stewart's opinion in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality
opinion) (noting that the "qualitative difference" between death and all other penalties requires a
greater degree of "reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a
specific case").
130. See supra note 71 (describing Court's prototypical example of actual innocence).
131. See supra text accompanying notes 96-98.
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decide the merits of a prisoner's claim than a federal judge would be.132
Furthermore, clemency decisions are highly vulnerable to political manipu-
lation; their use as a safety net may premise a prisoner's rights on the direc-
tion of the prevailing political winds. Convicted murderer Gary Graham's
recent, highly publicized effort to obtain a Texas clemency hearing high-
lights the obstacles that a prisoner may confront in his bid to present new
evidence of actual innocence to a governor or parole board.133
132. But cf. Louis D. Bilionis, Legitimating Death, 91 McH. L. REv. 1643 (1993). Professor
Bilionis argues that governors are constitutionally obligated to conduct critical independent as-
sessments of capital clemency applications. Id. at 1698. In his view, governors, as well as state
courts, are bound to enforce the Eighth Amendment norms of moral appropriateness, rational
orderliness, and procedural fairness in the administration of the death penalty. I. at 1682. The
Supreme Court fails to fully enforce Eighth Amendment values in capital cases, he explains,
because it balances the promotion of Eighth Amendment norms with the competing objectives of
respect for state autonomy and conservation of judicial resources. Id. at 1674-75, 1680. Because
governors and state courts are not subject to the same constraints as the Supreme Court, they
should not uncritically accept the limitations on Eighth Amendment values that are produced by
those constraints. Id. at 1685, 1692, 1698-99. Governors have an obligation under Article VI of
the Constitution to use their clemency power as a "powerful complementary force in society's
effort to ensure that basic Eighth Amendment values are realized in individual death cases." Id. at
1699.
133. See State ex reL Holmes v. Third Court of Appeals, No. 25,214-01, 1993 WL 312288
(Tex. Crim. App. Aug. 16, 1993). Graham's execution was scheduled for August 17, 1993. Id. at
*1. In July of 1993, Graham sued the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles in Texas state court,
claiming to have new evidence of actual innocence and alleging that the Texas Constitution re-
quired the Board to grant him a hearing on his claim of innocence. Id. Ultimately, his case went
to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, which ruled that continuing with the execution without a
hearing would violate Graham's constitutional rights. Id. at *3.
Judge Baird of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals indicated in his concurring opinion that
the Herrera decision was controlling in Graham's case, maldng executive clemency the only relief
available to Graham. Id. at *3-5. Judge Baird found it unclear, however, whether the state of
Texas provided a procedure by which a condemned person could obtain that relief. Id. at *5. In
Texas, the governor can exercise clemency upon the recommendation of the Board of Pardons and
Paroles. Id. In the case of an application for full pardon based on actual innocence, the Board
requires the applicant to submit "a written recommendation from the current trial officials of the
convicting court, and/or a certified order accompanied by findings of fact, and affidavits from
witnesses 'upon which the finding of innocence is based."' Id. at *5. According to Judge Baird,
the documents contemplated in this rule are prerequisites to having a claim of actual innocence
considered by the board. Id. at *5. He raised these questions:
Query: how does Graham get access to these documents? From what are these docu-
ments generated? . . . [T]he real issue which needs to be addressed . . . is one of
procedural due process, viz: does Texas provide a procedure by which a condemned
person may institute consideration of his innocence claim by the Board of Pardons and
Paroles?
Id. Then, referring to the Herrera Court's threshold showing of innocence, he stated:
What is of utmost importance is that if Graham can meet the threshold showing
(whatever that may be), the State of Texas [must provide] a vehicle by which his evi-
dence may be heard and a finding may be rendered regarding his claim of innocence....
[lf there is no vehicle then there is no due process for Graham.
Id. at *6.
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Another difficulty imposed by the Herrera decision is that the Court
may have opened the door to successive federal habeas claims based on
newly discovered exculpatory evidence by assuming, even arguendo, that
the execution of a person who can make a persuasive demonstration of ac-
tual innocence would be unconstitutional and give rise to federal habeas
relief.134 After inviting such claims in its opinions, the Court failed to pro-
vide any direction to judges in the lower federal courts, who now must
decide whether such claims can be entertained and, if so, what standards
should be applied for reaching the merits and for granting relief. The
judges also will have to decide what type of relief is appropriate.
If the Court ultimately decides that federal habeas claims of actual
innocence based on evidence discovered long after trial can be entertained,
then the tests suggested by Justice White and the dissenting Justices1 5 may
provide a foundation for the formulation of standards for review of claims
in capital habeas cases. The more difficult question of whether relief
should be provided in the form of a new trial or release from incarceration
remains open. If the test of probable innocence suggested by the dissent 3 6
is adopted for determining which cases warrant relief, it would seem ra-
tional that the relief should be release from incarceration. The proposed
probable innocence standard takes into account all evidence adduced at trial
plus the newly discovered evidence, according due regard to reliability.137
If this evidence establishes probable innocence, it follows that the original
jury, if it had heard all of the presently available evidence, almost certainly
would not have concluded that the defendant was guilty beyond a reason-
able doubt. Although this standard demands much more from the defendant
than would have been required at trial, it strikes a balance between the de-
fendant's compelling interest in obtaining his liberty and the state's strong
interest in the finality of criminal judgments.1 3 8
Several members of the Court expressed confidence that the Constitu-
tion's procedural protections, combined with the historical safeguards of
executive clemency and pardon, will allow the Court to avoid ever reaching
the most difficult question presented in Herrera: whether federal courts
may entertain convincing claims of actual innocence on habeas review, ab-
sent an independent constitutional violation.139 Perhaps this prediction will
134. See supra text accompanying notes 99-101.
135. See supra notes 30, 36, 113, 118-19 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 36, 119.
137. See supra note 36.
138. See supra note 127.
139. "If the Constitution's guarantees of fair procedure and the safeguards of clemency and
pardon fulfill their historical mission, it may never require resolution at all." Herrera, 113 S. Ct.
at 874 (O'Connor, L, concurring). "With any luck, we shall avoid ever having to face this embar-
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prove correct, but a decision following shortly after Herrera, Delo v.
Blair,140 suggests that the issue will continue to occupy the Court.
Walter Blair was sentenced to death for murder.14" ' In his third habeas
petition to the District Court for the Western District of Missouri, he
claimed to have new evidence-seven affidavits-which proved his actual
innocence of the crime. Five of the affiants alleged that another man,
Ernest Jones, admitted in their presence that he had killed the victim and
framed Blair. 43 Unlike the affidavits in Herrera, these did not rely on
hearsay, 144 and there were no internal inconsistencies on the relevant points
among the seven affidavits. 45 There also was a plausible explanation for
the delay in bringing forth the evidence-all seven affiants testified they
feared Jones because they knew he previously had committed multiple
murders.' 46 One affiant was a trial witness; her affidavit claimed that she
had falsified her trial testimony at Jones' direction because she feared
him.
147
The district court denied Blair's habeas petition. 14  The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit granted a temporary stay of execu-
tion and ordered a hearing on the merits of the appeal, indicating a need to
study Blair's claims in light of the Herrera decision.'49 One judge noted
rassing question again, since it is improbable that evidence of innocence as convincing as today's
opinion requires would fail to produce an executive pardon." Il at 875 (Scalia, J., concurring).
140. 113 S. Ct. 2922 (1993) (per curiam). Justice Blackmun wrote a dissenting opinion in
which Justice Stevens joined.
141. Blair v. Delo, No. 93-2824, 1993 WL 281858, at *1 (8th Cir. July 20, 1993) (2-1 deci-
sion), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 2922 (1993) (per curiam).
142. Id. (Heaney, J., concurring). Blair first raised this claim in state court, but it was denied
without comment. Missouri rules require that a new trial motion be made within 15 to 25 days of
the trial verdict; claims of newly discovered evidence are not cognizable in Missouri habeas
corpus proceedings. Id. at *2 (Heaney, J., concurring).
143. Id. at *3 (Heaney, J., concurring).
144. Id. (Heaney, J., concurring). Admissions are not excludable hearsay under the Federal
Rules of Evidence. FED. R. Evi. 801(d)(2)(A).
145. Blair, 1993 WL 281858, at *3 (Heaney, J., concurring).
146. Id. (Heaney, J., concurring).
147. Id. (Heaney, J., concurring).
148. Id. at *1.
149. Id. The court noted that it could dismiss an appeal on motion for stay if the appeal was
"frivolous and entirely without merit" and that a successive petition like Blair's required "the
presence of substantial grounds upon which relief might be granted." Id. (quoting Barefoot v.
Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 894, 895 (1983)). Judge John R. Gibson then stated:
The entire question is whether Blair's third petition states a claim that survives the
Supreme Court's decision in Herrera v. Collins. In Herrera there were three separate
opinions concurring in the judgment, and there was also a dissent. While we question
whether Blair's claim survives Herrera, because of the differing views of the several
Justices, we cannot conclude without more detailed study that Blair's claim is "frivolous
and entirely without merit" or that there is not a substantial question upon which relief
might be granted.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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that Blair's evidence was "considerably more persuasive" than Herrera's. 15 0
The United States Supreme Court vacated the stay of execution, however,
and held in a per curiam opinion that the Court of Appeals abused its dis-
cretion by granting a stay when the claims were "for all relevant purposes
indistinguishable" from those rejected in Herrera.151
The Blair decision illustrates the uncertainty that lower courts face as
they grapple with free-standing claims of actual innocence in the wake of
Herrera. After this decision it is only slightly clearer when-if ever-a
petitioner's evidence of actual innocence will be persuasive enough to merit
federal habeas review. The Court hinted in Blair that a petitioner's eviden-
tiary showing of innocence will have to cross a formidably high threshold
before a federal district court will grant an evidentiary hearing to further
evaluate the petitioner's evidence.152 Yet, paradoxically, the proof
presented with a habeas petition generally is limited to affidavits; if habeas
review is denied, the appellate court likewise will be limited to reviewing
those affidavits. 53 As Judge Heaney of the Eighth Circuit explained in
Blair, the petitioner "could only present us with something else if the dis-
trict court were to grant.., an evidentiary hearing." '154 That remark under-
scores the troublesome legacy of Herrera-the incongruity of demanding
extraordinarily persuasive evidence of actual innocence while, at the same
time, denying the petitioner a forum to present that evidence. In short,
Judge Heaney's comment exposed the paradox of actual innocence in fed-
eral habeas corpus.
KATHLEEN CAVA BoYD
150. Id at *2 (Heaney, J., concurring).
151. Delo v. Blair, 113 S. Ct. 2922, 2923 (1993) (per curiam).
152. See supra text accompanying notes 142-47 (describing evidence presented); supra text
accompanying note 151 (finding abuse of discretion for granting stay to consider this evidence).
153. Blair v. Delo, No. 93-2824, 1993 WL 281858, at *2 (8th Cir. July 20, 1993) (2-1 deci-
sion), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 2922 (1993) (per curiam). The petitioner could submit a deposition or
the transcript from a state court hearing to support his habeas petition, if the state had offered him
either opportunity.
154. Id.
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